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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

rnE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
V.

GAYLE LEE BOONE,

Case No. 15275

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, GAYLE LEE BOONE, appeals from a conviction of
l:nlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value in the
T~ird

Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Gayle Lee Boone, was charged with Unlawful
Jistribution of a Controlled Substance for Value in violation of
.'tah Code Ann.
:~:ce, 1977,

a jury

§58-37-S(a) (1953 as amended). On the 17th day of

the appellant was found guilty of the offense as charged
Subsequen~ly,

the appellant was sentenced to incarceration

- the ;;rah State ?rison for the indeterminate term of zero to ten
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third
Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the afternoon of April 27, 1977, Kayle Shaw, Junior
contacted the appellant and arranged to meet with him later in that
day at an establishment called "The Gym" (T. 21).

At that time,

Shaw was working as an undercover agent for the Utah State Liquor
and Narcotics Enforcement Division (T.l70).

Several months earlier

Shaw had been released from the Salt Lake County Jail where he
was being held pending trial on three counts of Aggravated Robbery,
felonies of the first degree, and another felony charge of Unlawful
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for
Value (T.20).

At the time of this action Shaw was still awaiting

trial on those charges (T.20).
Upon being released from jail Shaw reported to Tom Carleson
of the Bountiful City Police Department (T.80).

Carleson then

introduced Shaw to agents of the State Liquor and

~arcotics

Control Division (T.8l) and then put him to '..Jork as an ·.mdercover
agent (T.l70).

At that time Shaw told :he State agents that he

'\;-anted to bust Ga:rle Boone" (T. 82).
After contacting the ap8ellant on A8ril
contacted the State ::a::-cotics T)ivisi:m ·..:he::-e ~.e :alkec :-=: -::'·.Jm Cd:~''
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
by the Institute of o~~i~e
Museum and Library
Services
(T.26).
Shaw
then
proceeded
to :heprovided
T)i~isi2n's
a: :~e
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, 'may contain errors.
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~irgrounds
~~ousand

where he was searched (T.26) and suoplied with one

dollars 'tlOrth of twenty dollar bills

(T. 27).

An

electronic device was then attached to Shaw's body (T. 32).

The

jevice transmitted sounds originating in the irmnediate area to
oolice radios

(T.33-34)

Shaw then drove his own car to the Gym, but he was followed
::1ere by twelve other agents driving another six cars (T. 174).
Sha•.oJ contacted the appellant at "The Gym" (T. 34).

Shaw then

cestified that some time later a transaction took place in which he
exchanged the thousand dollars for a package containing a brown
sabstance (T. 54).

When the officers listening to their radios heard

a prearranged signal from Shaw they arrested Shaw,

the appellant

and the co-defendant, David Ed<tJard Albo (T .185-186).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANT CLAUSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE
~ITED STATES CONSTITUTION fu~ ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED
MONITORI':1G BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS OF CONVERSATIONS
TRA.'l"S:-fiTT'SD BY NEANS OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES.
The appellant moved to suppress a recording of a conversation
:e~:;een

himself and the State's informant, Kayle Shaw, Jr.

(R.54).

-.~e

Jlction was denied and the tape 'N"as received into evidence (T. 333).

-~e

tape -.,as '!lade 'Jy recording a broadcast of the conversation

The broadcast was heard by some police officers
~ad

f:~ic~ed

and were observing Shaw, although there was some
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The State agents '"'ho '.vere in charge of Sha,.v' s acti.vic'.es
did not bother to obtain a search '"arrant prior to the transmiss>
and recording of the conversation.

Such a failure violated

appellant's constitutional protection against unreasonable
and seizures guaranteed in Article I,

t~e
searc~.e:

Section 14 of the Constit;:t::

of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the Cnited States Constituti.o,
as it is applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth .-\rnendment.

This is not to say that officials canr.c:

use such devices and make such recordings, but only that before
doing so,

the authorities must obtain a '"'arrant issued on the bas::

of a determination by a neutral and detached magistrate after s'lo·-:.
that there

i~

orobable cause to believe that a crime is being or:

be corrunitted.
POINT A
THE FOURTH AJ1ENDME::-JT A!!D ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CTAH PROTECT THE PRIVACY
OF UTAH CITIZENS AND PROHIBIT THE WARRANTLESS
SURVEILLA;lCE A::-JD SEIZURE OF THEIR CO~!VERSATIONS
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC ilEVICES.
The Fourth Amendment and Article I. Section

1~

of the

Constitution of C'tah protect privacv of people, not specified p~~
Kat:: v. United States, 389 U.S.
2d l.

-'d2 P.2d 6C.. (1007)

347 (1967).

In o:her ·N·orC.s,

State v. Kent,
c::ere is

:10

:o

need :or : .

pr-i_vacv.
J~stice

Stewa=~

C:

descri~ed
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I.Jhat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own horne or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Arnendrnent protection. [citations omitted].
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in the area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
[citations omitted] 389 U.S. at 351-352.

:n a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan gave a more detailed
:escription of this right of privacy:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." The question, however,
is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that quest ion
requires reference to a "place".
My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable".
389 U.S. at 362 Harlan, J. Concurring.
In Katz v. United States, supra,
~e:-son'

the Court held that a

s conversations were within this expectation of privacy and

:"e overhearing of such conversations constituted a seizure within
:~e

meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The pro teet ion of this

osJect of privacy is accomplished by means of the •.varrant clause
.. t":le Fourth AmEndment (and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution
Ctah).

The purpose of the warrant clause is to place limitations

··· o::ficial activities.
:~a:

These limitations include:

The requirement

officials r:1ust present thei:::- estimate of probable cause for the

:;:ac~ed

''"'~~.

sc:-utinv of a neut:-al rnag:'..strate.

Secondly, during a

a ·.var:-ant compels o::':"icers to observe precise li:nits established
Finallv, after :he search has

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Katz v.

United States, supra, a transmitter 'N'as ?laced in

a phone booth enabling police to overhear the defendant's conversath·
Even though it was operated only when the defendant was using the
phone and in a limited means,

the court refused to uphold the searc1

stating:
[T)his Court has never sustained a search upon the sole
ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence
of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their
activities to the least intrusive means consistent with thac
end.
389 U.S. at 356-357.
As noted above this Court also recognizes that the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah are
aimed at the protection of a person's privacy.
Furthermore, by enacting Utah Code Ann.

State v. Kent, supra.

§76-9-402 (1973), the State

legislature has recognized the need to protect the privacy of people.
This statute provides:

76-9-402. Privacy violation- (1) A person is guilty of
privacy violation if, except as authorized by law, he:
(a)
Trespasses on property with intent to subject
anvone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a private
place; or
(b)
Installs in any private place, without the consent
of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any
device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying,
or broadcasting sounds or events in the place or uses any
such unauthorized installation; or
(c) Installs or uses outside of a private place any
device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting
sounds originating in the place 'N'hich •,vould not ordinarily
be audible or comprehensible outside, without the consent
of the person or persons entitled to pri~acy there
(2)
Privacy violation is a Class 3 ~isdemeanor

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

An important aspect of this statute is the exception
of "except as authorized by law".

Obviously, this is intended to

allow such invasions of privacy if done by judicial authorizationa valid search warrant.
POINT B
A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROt1 WARRANTLESS
SURVEILLANCE AND SEIZURE OF HIS CONVERSATIONS
THROUGH USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES IS NOT HAlVED
MERELY BECAUSE SUCH CONVERSATION IS WITH A
GOVERNMENT AGENT.
In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) the Supreme
Court was faced with a fact situation very similar to the case at
hand.

Four of the justices distinguished Katz v. United States, supra,

and upheld the search; Justice Black concurred on the basis of his
dissent in Katz v. United States, supra,

(he believed that the Fourth

Amendment applied only to tangible, not communicative evidence).
Justice Brennan refused to apply Katz v. United States, supra,
retroactively, and Justice Harlan authored a strong dissent that
the two other justices concurred in.
The basic argument of Justice vfuite's plurality opinion
is that the petitioner had waived the protection of his privacy
by talking to a third person, who incidentally was wired to

broadcast the conversation to government agents.
this

conc~usion

=~sti.nguis:Ced.

To be able to reach

the case of Katz v. United States, supra, had to be
Justice \•Thite found two disti.r:guishing factors:

(l)

i:J Katz neither :cart? to the conversations kne•.v that the government

·:as ea·;esdr:-.Jp;:Ji.ng, 3.nd (::) even in Katz there '"'as r.o justifiable and
:~~s:~:~tional::.·

?rotected

ex~ectation

that the person with whom
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one is conversing will not later reveal the conversation to the
police.

To support this second distinguishing

:'eat~re

:..'hi~e

Justice

cited Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), and Hoffa v. United States, 385 lJ S.
293 (1966).

The theme that Justice White erroneously extracted

from these three cases •,vas that the Fourth Amendment does not protec:
a person from "misplaced confidence" in a friend or infor:ner.
He then went on to hold that if the conduct and revelations of an
undercover agent do not invade one's "constitutionally justifiable
expectations of privacy,"

then a simultaneous recording or electron:.

transmission to others likewise does not invade one's privacy.
Stated otherwise, "a constitutional license to employ secret agents
generates the correlative right to electronically eavesdrop without
prior judicial authorization."

Collll!lent, Electronic EavesdroopinE

and the Right to Privac·1, 52 Boston University Law Review 831
There are t·,vo ?roblems •,vith Justice 'N'hite's opinion·
:'irst is that he misstated the legal
conclusion of waiver,

~asis

(:.9"~1

The

that leads to his

the second is that he fails to correctly

analyze the interests that are at stake.

The misstated legal

~asis

will be discussed first.
-:'~e

case t":;.at Justice ~'.J":-lite c:i..':es

:o star:.d

for

r:--.e

~rc~cs:.::~
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::~e

offer.

:~e

basis of its holding were that at the time the recording was

Two of the major factors that the court found to be

jeing made it was not being transmitted to third persons and secondly,
che defendant had assumed the risk of government intrusion because
~e

was attempting to bribe a person who he knew to be a government

agent.

Obviously, the factual basis of the holding in this case is

clearly distinguishable from the facts both in United States v. White,
supra, and the facts in the case at bar.

In both United States v.

:fuite, supra, and in the case at hand the conversations were broadcast to third persons and in both there r,vas no expectation of direct
governmental involvement.
In both Lewis v. United States, supra, and in Hoffa v. United
States, supra,

the court based its decision on a trespass analysis.

::,at type of analysis had been strongly rejected in Katz v. United
S:ates, supra.
:~vited

guest could not be found to have cor=itted a trespass

t~at

(at

time Fourth Amendment questions were anlayzed in terms of

:::estJass).
:',at

In Hoffa the court held that an informer who was an

t~e

It is doubtful, hor,vever, under the trespass analysis

invitation r,vould have extended to uninvited third party

go•:ernment agents who were listening by means of electronic devices.
In Lewis v. United States, supra, a government agent purchased
:3::-cot~cs

at the defendant's residence then arrested him.

The court

:.ocd ::Ca: :~e Fourth ,'\.,:nendment does not protect one ·,;ho voluntarily
::~··er:s

~-~s ~ase

a cor.stitutional::.:, protected area into a cor=ercial center.
j~d

not ~n 1 :olve a~y electronic transmitters or recorders.
co third parties.

..;; -.l

It simp l:r
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States, supra.
The analytical problems with White v. United States, supra,
are discussed in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion.

Justice

White's opinion is analytically incorrect with respect to his
interpretation of both the orivacy and waiver issues.

The privacy

question will be discussed first.
The first problem with I.Jhite' s analysis of the privacy issue
is

that the interests simply are not the same when there is

misplaced confidence in an individual who turns out to be an informant
and when a conversation is electronically broadcast to third persons
who are government agents.

Typically, when one person engages

anot~:

in conversation there are two considerations: whowill hear the conversation and how will the conversation be reported to others.

Befori

entering a conversation of a private nature the speaker will usuallv
analyze these concerns in terms of his subjective belief that the
listener will not broadcast the content of

t~is

conversation to

others and his knowledge of the credibility of the listener (in
case the listener does make such a broadcast).

If there is a

substantial risk that conversations expected to be private are
broadcast to third persons, an individual's freedom to make his
own choice of who he will speak with and what he will say will be
substantially impaired.
Like•t~ise,

if people are subject t::J r;;.e fea:c tl":at thei:c

conversations '.vill 1::le b:coadcast to goverccDen': agents ot:cer i.:1:eresc;
will be affected.

T~ese

interests

~ere

e~:;,quen:lv descri~ed

jv
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supra.

His description is well worth repeating:
The impact of the practice of third-party bugging,
must, I think, be considered such as to undermine that
confidence and sense of security in dealing with one
another that is characteristic of individual relationships
between citizens in a free society.
It goes beyond
the impact on privacy occasioned by the ordinary type
of "informer" investigation upheld in Lewis and Hoffa.
The argument of the plurality opinion, to the effect that
it is irrelevant whether secrets are revealed by the mere
tattletale or the transistor, ignores the differences
occasioned by third-party monitoring and recording which
insures full and accurate disclosure of all that is said,
free of the possibility of error and oversight that
inheres in human reporting.
Authority is hardly required to support the proposition
that words would be measured a good deal more carefully
and communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations
were being transmitted and transcribed. Were third-party
bugging a prevalent practice, it might well smother that
spontaneity- reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious,
and defiant discourse- that liberates daily life.
Much
offhand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count on
the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact
of a limited audience, and the likelihood that the listener
will either overlook or forget what is said, as well as the
listener's inability to reformulate a conversation without
having to contend with a documented record.
All these
values are sacrificed by a rule of law that permits official
monitoring of private discourse limited only by the
need to locate a willing assistant [footnote omitted]
401 U.S. at 787-789, Harlan J. dissenting.
Another significant effect of this fear of third person

1::icial monitoring is that people r,vill lose an important medium

:·Jr relieving social tension.
::~~ngs
J~

as making

Tension is often relieved by such

idle threats, boasting about fictitious acts

even falsely claiming responsibility for the commission of well

c~]iic:i.zed

crimes.

3CCr"es as a
<:~Jr.

~s

~eal

I:1 such conversation little harm is done, and it

thy outlet for various ':ens ions .

S\.:;:J:Jressed the tensions ·,vill rer:~ain,

3ut if the conver-

and these tensions
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on the exercise of free speech would jean understatement.
Or..;ellian nightmare of 1984 will become a cruel reality.

The
In an-;

conversation it would become reasonable to believe that there
are government agents listening somewhere.

The protection that

is built into our federal and state constitutions against such
omnipresence is the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which prohibits
searches and seizures without a warrant.

The protection simply

is that government agents must show to a neutral and detached
magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
is being or will be committed before government agents are allc••ed
to

lis~en

to a person's personal conversations by means of a

transmitter attached to the body of an informant.
Some might argue that the government may act with self
restraint and resoect for privacy.

This argument •,;as expressly

rejected in Katz v. United States, supra.

The Fourth Amendment

was not premised on good faith and sel:-restraint of the police.
The Fourth Amendment ·..;as ;ne:nised on the abuses o: po•..;er in King
George's writs of assistance during Colonial times.

The Fourth

Amendment functions as a check on t':le abuses o: authority and
·.,;or s t

t

~he

endanc ies o: go•:ern:ne:1 t.
With respect

tJ

t".:"le ·..;a:_~Jer

,:;1.1E3'::.::-:;.,

.;~s::...:E: ·.-.r.i::e's
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3.:1a:··s-

:~at

is used as the model.

;~rveillance

'tlith an innocent citizen the risks of

are not assumed by the actor.

The :::isks come to that

acc:or when the police decide to "bug" an informer.

This means

:hat any unconventional behavior as well as behavior that is on
:~.e

borderline of illegality r.vill arouse the curiosity of the authorities.

Once that C;..Jriosity is aroused the authorities are allowed to
ac:ac'l a transmitter to a confidant of the speaker and listen to
any and all conversations that their suspect engages in.

This

:an be done even if there is little or no reason to believe that
:1ere is any criminal activity involved.
Such imposition of hidden and unforeseen risks on the citizenry
~re
:~.e

expressly prohibited by Katz v. United States, supra.

Following

analysis in Katz it is reasonable to assume that a person

s:eaking to another about possible criminal activities subjectively
:1oes not expect that other person to broadcast the content of the

:o:wersation to third persons.

However,

using a reasonable

Je:son test, it is quite likely that the content of the conversation
..·~~~ l:le told to others.

But it is quite unlikely that any reasonable

:ecson .vould believe that his conversation is being simultaneously
::oadcast to some government agent listening to his radio in his car.

c:a:eC: si:rmly, a person does not '"aive his interest that a conversation
·::::

~.ot

'Je simu:_taneous:.y 'Jroadcast to gover:1ment agents simply
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POINT C
EFFECTIVE POLICE INVESTIGATION IS :--TOT HAMPERED
BY REQUIRING THAT A 1-IARR.A.:'IT BE OBTAINED BEFORE
GOVERNMENT AGENTS CAN ENGAGE Hl THIRD PERSON
MONITORING; CONSEQUENTLY ANY SUCH ~ONITORING
WITHOUT A \.JARRANT IS UNCONSTITUTI0~1AL.
In People v. Beavers, 393 Xich.

554, 227 N.\.J.2d 511 (19:;

the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected Justice White's analysis
and legal basis in United States v.

~~ite,

supra, and held that

a warrant must be obtained before government agents could monitor
conversations between an informant and a suspect if any evidence
of that conversation, other than the informant's version, is to
be used in court.

The Michigan court accepted Justice Harlan's

view that a person's expectation of privacy should not be subject
to the possibilitv that communications directed to particular
persons are simultaneously being intercepted by third party govern,,
agents.

It is also important to note that the Michigan Legislat·Jr;

has enacted provisions in its penal code 1 that are similar to t~"
1.

for eavesdro in or surveillance
oses] Sec. i2:'
property owned or under the control o any ot.'ler ?ers.·
to subject that person to eavesdropping or surveil-:..ance is guilty of a misderra:
§28 807(3) Using derice to eavesdrop upon conversation] Sec. 539c. Any .
person 'NTIO is present or •Nho is not present during a private conversation and ·.,~:
·Nilfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the conser.t:
all parties thereto, or wtlo ~.owingly aids, employs or procures another persoo::
the same in violation of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by ~-,;r:'
in a state prison for not mre than 2 years or by a fine of not roore than S", .f
both.
§28.807(4)
surveillance or eaveserop in devices] Sec. 539d .::
person ·Nho insta ~s in anv private :J ace, ·.ntr.out :0.e consent ot the person or
persons en~itled to pri•Tacy there, any device ::'or obser;i....'1g, photograDr.:Lcg. ;~ ..
eavesdroopwg upcn t..'ce sour.ds or events in s:.:ch place, ·or >..;.ses anv s:.:ch ur.au~·-
i..."':.Stallation, is guil~'
a :eluny ?unishable '-::;? :i.•::~r:_s('T'l'::ent in a sta[e ?r:. 5 '-~
for not :;x:Jre than ::' years or ':Jy a firte of :cot :>Dre :::.".ar. S:', ·JCO or 'Jot'-:

o=
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2f

Ctah Code Annotated §76-9-402 (1973) . 2

The same primary interests

:eceive protection in both Utah and Xichigan.
Most of this argument has dealt with the probability of
aJuse if this type of surveillance is not subjected to the warrant
:equiremen t.

Undoubtedly, the government will argue that this type

:f surveillance is necessary for police investigation.
~; q;.~estion

There is

that this technique is necessary for investigation.

:cJ'1ever, the government officials

are not the people who should make

::.e determination of which people will be subjected to surveillance.

:'.e Fourth Amendment requires that such a determination will ultimately
Je made by a neutral and detached magistrate.

The magistrate can

Ja:<e an objective determination of whether the government agents
'ave probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed .
. ~;s is the means by which our founding fathers saw fit to curb the
a\uses of the English monarchy - such abuses, incidentally, were a
:ajor cause of the revolutionary r.var.

In the case at hand, the fact

:~at a r,varrant was not obtained must be taken as an admission of

:ack of ;nobable cause at the time the drug buy r.vas supposed to have

:a:<e:1 ?lace.

The government agents had taken elaborate precautions

76-9-402. Privacy violation. - (l) A person is guilty of privacy viola~r. i~. e.xcept as authorized by law, he:
. . (a) Trespasses on property ,,;ith intent to subject anyone to eavesdropping
.: ::.1er survei:..lance in a private place; or
i.J)
Installs b any private place, rNithout the consent of the person or
:,:acr.s sntit:.ed :o orivacv t:Cere, any device for observing, pr.otographing,
~:::Leg, arr:pli.:';:iccg, or broadcasti.t<,g sounds or events i.'1 the place of uses
c" ~(~ .T.ac:t::Cor:.zed installation, or
'c) bstalls x uses outside of a private place any cevice :or hearing,
::::..->: . .o::m~i:"-.T-.z, or 'croadcas:i.cg scunds originat:.ng in the place ·Nb.ich

. :·::: -~.:~~~~~-~T>~/~~~~~~_s ::~~.~~~~b~~_s;~~~-a~~t~;;~~ ·Ni~~out ~'ce

:':":..-,-,3.c~c
i..s 3.Lawc-:..ass
3 ::ri3C.er:teanor.
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to set up a drug buy.
informant.

(T. 171)

The buy was set up in advance through the
The informant was subjected to a skin search

and search of his vehicle.
to his body.

(T. 173)

The electronic transmitter was taped

The agents made photocopies of all the

bills that were to be used in the purchase.

(T. 175)

The informanc

was searched a second time, and the money was counted a second time
when the informant left the gym to get something to eat.
Finally,

(T. 180)

there were about a dozen other officers in six cars

the conversation.

(T. 174)

monitor~

With all of these elaborate precautions

the government agents did not see fit to obtain a warrant - a very
simply procedure if there is in fact probable cause to believe a
crime is being or <.vill be committed.

Stated otherwise,

the governmer.: ·

agents took elaborate precautions to protect the interests of the
State, but did not even take the slightest precaution

to protect the

constitutional rights of the appellant.
The reasonableness of not obtaining a warrant prior to
conducting a search is determined by balancing the interests of the
State against those interests that an individual has in requiring tba:
a warrant be obtained.

State v. Folkes,

565 P.2d 1125 (Utah, 1977).

The compeating interests were described in State v. Beavers,

supra;

We are acutelv sensitive to the fundamental interests
involved when prevailing law enforcement techniques are
balanced against protections guaranteed cit~zens ~nder _
the state and Federal con titutions.
Wi:~ the advent or
increasingly sophisticate electronic sur7eillance equipment, ~he evolving body o law ~hie~ seeks :o reconcile
the need for e~Eecti7e oo ce investi~a:ive orac:ices i~
combatting criminal acciv ~ wi:h the c~i~cus 3oec:re o:
the Onvellian B:..2 Brot~ler
S ~:-aug::c r,.;i :~:. c.J2":p~exities.
2~7 0T',.J 2d at 51-<~
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:1

resolving these two conflicting interests the Nichigan court

:~en

reasoned;
Participant monitoring is practiced extensivelv
throughout the country and represents a vitally important
investigative tool of law enforcement.
Equally significant
is the security and confidence enjoyed by our citizenry
in knowing that the risk of intrusion by this type of
electronic surveillance is subject to the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
By interposing the search warrant requirement prior to
engaging in participant monitoring, the risk that one's
conversation is being intercepted is rightfully limited
to circumstances involving a party whose conduct has
provided probable cause to an independent magistrate to
suspect such party's involvement in illegal activity.
The warrant requirement is not a burdensome formality
designed to protect those who would engage in illegal
activity, but, rather a procedure which guarantess a
measure of privacy and personal security to all citizens.
The interests of both society and the individual should
not rest upon the exercise of the unerring judgment
and self-re~traint of law enforcement officials.
Our laws
must ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may
continue to engage in private discourse, free to speak
•,vith the uninhibited spontanceity that is characteristic
of our democratic society.
227 NW 2d at 515.
Absent a specific finding of probable cause either in the

.3SJance of a warrant or in a pretrial suppression motion the seizure
:::his evidence must be deemed to be unreasonable.

Furthermore,

:::s :ourt is prohibited from reviewing the record at the trial to
':~.c

?robable cause.

Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89 (1964).

Consequently,

:'" :eoe recording used in the trial constituted a violation of
:·e ?.:J?ellant' s Fourch Amendment rights.
'~:ressed

The tape must have been

and the failure to do so requires a reversal of the

':~:::rendered

belo•,v.

·.:: )e reelanded :o

~raoo

v. Ohio,

367 C:.S.

643 (1961)

The case

c'"'e Third Jistrict Court for a ne•,v trial.
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POINT II
THE APPELLAN'l' S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 't!AS DENIED BY THE
CUMMULATIVE ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Each of the errors in the following points ·constitutes
prejudicial error that would require a reversal of the judgment of the
court below.

But these errors must also be considered to have

had a cummulative effect on the outcome of the trial.

Even if the

individual errors are not prejudicial in and of themselves this
court may determine if the appellant's case was prejudicial by the
cummulative effect of the erro

State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230,

282 P.2d 323 (1955).
POINT A
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLO\HNG
THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS BY THE
APPELLANT.
In the course of the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, Jr.
the prosecutor elicited statements that connected the appellant with
other bad acts and statements that disparaged the appellant's
(T.39, 140 and 142).

charact~

At no time did the appellant introduce any

evidence about his character.
On direct examination of Shaw by the prosecutor, the
following exchange took place:
Q:
So this conversation took place over about forty
minutes?

A:

About forty minutes.

Did vou ~ave any conversation wit~ Boone -about pu~chas~ng any other narcotics from him'

Q:

A:

~r.

3oone

Yes, I did.

AboutLaww~a~
:~mefor did
:~ac
ta~e
~lace
in and
:~e
course
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o:

A:

About ten to seven.

Q:

And what did that consist of?

A:

Angel Dust.

Q:

And just tell me what you said and what he said.

A:

Can you repeat that?

Q:

Just tell me what you said and what he said.

A:
He told me he still has an ounce of Angel Dust down
in his crib.

Q: Now, can you translate that for us what "an ounce
of Angel Dust in his crib" means?
MR. KELLER:
Your Honor, at this point I am going to
interpose an objection.
I have a motion to make outside
the presence of the Jury.
I ask the Court allow us to
do so at this time.
(T. 39)
As counsel for the appellant pointed out and as is reflected
~ :~e

record, a mistrial had been granted the day before this

ixc~ange

on the basis that Sha'.v had volunteered a statement on cross-

~~~ation

that he had purchased narcotics from the appellant prior

:: :1e date of the purchase that is the subject of this case.

: :.), R. 50)
Later,
:·.,

~allowing

in redirect examination of Shaw by the prosecutor,

exchange took place:

Q:
Could vou have made the buy from Mr. Boone on the 27th
had vou told him the truth that you were working as an
undercover agent?

A:

No,

I didn't.

Q:

You couldn'::

A·

If I told him7

(I·

Yeah.

I said, could you have bought from him?

A byI thedou~~
I ~cu:J
aliveprovided
right
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MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I object to the response.
It's
unresponsive.
It's unduly prejudicial.
I have a motion
to make outside the presence of the Jury and I would ask
the Court to allow me to do that at the proper recess.
THE COURT: Very well. The object ion is sustained and the
answer is stricken and the Jury admonished to disregard the
answer of the witness.
(T.l40)
Later in redirect examination the prosecutor elicited a statement

f~c:J

Sha•..J that he had fired his attorney because she was working cvith the
appellant and she said the appellant was going to set Shaw up (T.l42)
Out of the presence of the jury a motion for a mistrial was denied
(T.l46).
With respect to the first statement about the appellant
possessing other drugs, there was a motion for a mistrial that •.vas
deC"tied (T.45).

In denying the motion the court seAmed to indicate

that it was improper for the statement to be elicited, but he felt
that the evidence was not prejudicial (T. 43, 45), the same basis •.vas
given for the second motion for a mistrial (T.l46).

The Court

did not give any instruction to disregard the statement when the jury
had returned (T.46, 147).
The standard for the trial court to use in determining when
a mistrial should be granted is given in Justice :1aughan' s dissentin;
opinion in State v. Maestas, 560 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1977).

The test is

Upon a motion for mistrial the court must ·.veigh the dange=
of prejudice, to tl:l.e defense, against tr.e :::>racticabilitv
of reducing or eliminating that danger by ~hoosing a
.
new jury. The essence of j~dicial discretion in dealing .
with a misadvent'-lre is to so manage ::Jatters so as to con:=:.
the danger of j~rv ?rejudice, to t~e extent :::>racticab:e
[footr.ote omitted], §560 P.2C. at 3~6. ~aug:Can J. dissen<:::c:
As for

t~e

::anger o: ?:-ejud:.ce,

::::::.e fac:o:-s to cons:,:er ';--
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~'.e
:2

statements about other drugs and firing his attorney appear

".ave been elicited intentionally.

Those statements were never

:::icken and the jury was not instructed to disregard them.
~: ~ust

Finally,

be remembered that the statements were made during the testimony

:: :he first witness.
Evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs is inadmissible
.:.:ess it fits within one of the exceptions to that rule.

Rule 55

:::he Utah Rules of Evidence is the codification of that rule.

It

:::vides:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a
crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime
or civil 'Nrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified
occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence
is admissible when relevant to prove some other material
fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity.
"e Jnly exceptions that fit this case would be to prove intent or
:~.:.:-,.

Both the intent and plan in the case at hand r.vere to distribute

':c~~rolled

substance for value.

The statement that the appellant

" i:c ;:Jossession of a different type of substance has little or no
::J~at~·:e

value in the case at hand.

It only shm.;s that the

:··e::ant ·,vas allegedly violating the law allowing the jury to
·'e:
--

Jr\

~:;
o·

tr.e basis of ::he appellant's bad character that he made the
::Ce case at :Cand.

~dence

is c:.eac-l.:; ir.admissible.

idmi~ted~~

-2:.--t~

r;nder Rule 55 of the Ctah Rules of Evidence

:1a:·-.:.-:::e

with respect to the second

the :curt did all that it could to reduce its
:;-:-:e:-:':-.e:.ess,

t·:-te jur:: did hear the remark and its
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resulting prejudice must be cons ide red in conjunct ion with the pre\·i,1
remark.

The substance of the final remark is that the appellant is

interfering with Shaw's right to counsel.

This does nothing but

cast the appellant in a bad light as the statement would not be

admissible for any purpose under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
The case law provides examples of when statements are so
prejudicial in and of themselves to require the reversal of a case
on appeal.

Evidence that the defendant had been charged with a crime

in the past,

even though never tried on the charge is prejudicial

error, State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8,

361 P. 2d 412 (1961).

Testirnon:'

about a prior arrest for a similar crime than was charged required
reversal, State v. Kazda,

14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963).

Since

the statement here involved acts that '"ere illegal and somewhat relac2
to the charge in the case at hand they were just as prejudicial as

t~

remarks in State v. Dickson, supra, and State v. Kazda, supra.
Another factor that substantially contributes to the
prejudicial nature of the remarks was that some of them had been
intentionally elicited from the witness.
context in which they were raised,

This is easily seen by tte

(T. 39, 142)

and the ?rosecutor' s

arguments to make the statement admissible (T.40-41, 42-43, 144-145).
The rule given by this court is that a mistrial is to be granted wh~
the prosecutor intentionally elicits inadmissible statements from a
witness.

In State

V.

Hartman,

101 C'tah 298,

119 p 2d E~

c:gc.l),

this court stated,

:tJere it shuwn to be an 3.C :e'Jlot: ~o get :.:1 2,/idcnce c~e
prejudicial ~eference to a:1c~~er :~~~e. s~J2~ ?U~?·:se ~~
r.veli. ha,.re klOved ::-..e cour: :J ciecl3.re a. ::.:.s::::-:..~::_ :!.O~ en . .
the Law
grounC.
o~ ?re~·.J.C:...:e
:;~..:.::
a.sInstitute
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''

:-:s

r"J1e is followed in State v_ St. Clair, 3 l:tah 2d 230,

;:J (1955);

282 P.2d

and in State v. Case, 547 P. 2d 221 (Utah, 1976).

'tate cannot claim that the prosecutor lacked notice.

The

This is because

, :nistrial had been granted on the previous day because Shaw had

rde a statement about another drug purchase from the appellant.

:5

It

quite obvious that evidence of a prior sale is much more

;:o)ative of the intent or plan to sell narcotics then a statement

a:out present possession of narcotics or that the appellant had

::.:e:-ferred lvith the witness' relationship with his attorney.
There was further prejudice because the court failed to
i:.struct the jury to disregard the first and third statements (T .46, 147).
~:~ut

an instruction of that nature the evidence is left in for the

::n's consideration, State v. St. Clair, supra.

Such an instruction

a:so tends to cure the prejudicial nature of the statement,
~.

supra; State v. Hodges,

State~

30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P. 2d 1322 (1974).

The final factor that contributed to the prejudicial nature

c:

t~e

statements was the time at which they <,vere elicited.
The first was elicited in the first several hours of testi-

':r:; (T. 39).

The second and third statements came on the morning of

t·, second day of trial.

'·:·>

Since they came at times when relatively

other information had been given to the jury, the appellant

'" 2ds':

in a bad light from the outset.
'tlhen all of chese factors are taken :ogether, the nature of

;:a:e:nen:s,

the :'.ntentional eliciting of the statements, the lack

c: >str·..:c:i.Jn from c:"\e cour:: and ::he ti:ne in the trial ""hen they
~a.:'~.

a:~

add·..::: :c

::Ceir ·~eir.g s•_tbs:antially ?rejudicial.
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Since the statements were made so early in the trial made by the very first witness
would have been minimal".

both were

the inconvenience of a mistrial

The trial court should have granted a

mistrial.
The standard for review of an erroneous failure to grant
a mistrial was given in State v. Hodges, supra.

In that case this

Court stated:
Nevertheless, the processes of justice should not be
distorted simply for the purpose of censuring a mistake.
the critical inquiry should be whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the incident so prejudiced the jury that
in its absence there might have been a different result.
Due to his advantaged position and consistent with
his responsibilities as the authority in charge of the
trial, the inquiry is necessarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
He should view such an
episode in the light of the total proceeding, and if he
thinks that there has been such prejudice that there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant cannot have a
fair and impartial determination of his guilt or innocence.
he should of course grant a mistrial.
But inasmuch as this
is his primary responsibility, when he has given due
consideration and ruled upon the matter, this court on
review should not upset his ruling unless it clearly
appears that he has abused his discretion. [footnotes
omitted] 577 P.2d at 1324.
With regard to the nature of the discretion of the trial judge, this
court has stated "if this discretion is reasonably used, and is not
shown to have been abused, arbitrar:r, or capricious,
of the trial court should not be disturbed",

the judgment

[footnote omitted].

State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (1975)
The :rial court acted in an arbitrarv and

a mistrial

beca~se

Kayle

S~aw

stated

t~at

~e

ca~ricicGs ~an~~=

~a~ ~a~e

~

?~~or
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?L~=~~=

,; narcotics from the appellant.
J~ejudicial.

Such a statement is highly

The effect of the statements here taken standing

alone or in combination is just as prejudicial as the statement made
:~at

resulted in the first mistrial.

The trial court's two decisions

cannot be reconciled and consequently must be regarded as arbitrary
l~.d

capricious.

The judgment must be reversed and the case remanded

:J the Third District Court for a new trial.

POINT B
IN CLOSING ARGG~NT THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT
BY COMMENTING ON THE APPELLANT FAILING TO TESTIFY AND BY
PRESENTING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE JURY k~D THIS
MISCONDUCT RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT.
In the course of the rebuttal porcion of the prosecutor's
argument to the jury, the prosecutor made the following remarks:
[Kayle Shaw]is given his presumption of innocence and that
rides •,..rith him until he is tried on August the 1st.
Counsel
for some reason opened this and I am even very, very
reluctant to go into it but it is still open.
He read the instruction about the defendant not testifying
and not creating a presumption against him and he said the
reason •,..rhv the defendant did not testifv -- he said I am
a skillful prosecutor and I would have had a chance to
cross-examine him.
No question about that.
I would suggest
that maybe that is the reason.
I don't know but, you know,
Kayle Shaw testified and Kayle Shaw was subjected to crossexamination.
Kayle Shaw was subjected to cross-examination
for almost two and a half hours by two very skillful attorneys.
He submitted himself to cross-examination and he succeeded.
Succeeded one hundred percent in that cross-examination.
Kavle Shaw is a criminal.
I don't ~now, ~ecause he had some
---he wasn't convicted of the offense that he had admitted
on t~-;e stand ':-~e comr;:itted:
':he ?Ossess:_on of narcotics,
LSJ.
Sixtv-eigh: ~its of LSD is a heck of a lot less than
a thousand- do::ars of Phencycl~dine, animal tranquilizer,
as vou heard the chemist testifv.
A thousand dollars an
c~n~~
~ n, ~c~ ~a~~ times tha~ cou:d be c t and dist=~~uted
~~d re~~s ~i~~:ed.
~ t~ousand dol:ars a~d
t is hard to
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expensive than gold.

Pretty expensive stuff.

Well, because Kayle Shaw is caught with sixty-eight hits
of acid in his car and some marijuana he is a "criminal."
We are dealing, if I can use the phrase, with bigger
crooks than Kayle Shaw on a thousand dollars an ounce worth
of PCP or Phencyclidine.
(T. 483-484)
The argument of defense counsel that the prosecutor claimed
he was responding to was:
The defendant in any criminal case as the Court has informed
you has an absolute right not to take the stand and testi0
if he does not '"'ant to.
That's a Constitutional Right and t:.
Court has instructed you that the mere fact that a defendant
has not availed himself of the privilege which the law gives
him should not prejudice him in any way.
It should not
be considered as any indication either of his guilt or his
innocence.
The failure of the defendant to testify is
not even a circumstance against him and no presumption of
guilt can be indulged in the minds of the Jury.
Why? Becau;,
a defendant may be satisfied with the evidence as it has
been presented.
The defendant may have other reasons. As
you can see, Mr. Yocom is a skilled prosecutor, a skilled
cross-examiner and it is -- there are numerous reasons whv
the defendant may not want to testify and it is for that ·
reason that the law -- the Court instructs you that the la"
in our system of justice is that you may not even assume. tha:
he is guilty because he has not testified.
The burden at
all times remains upon the State.
(T.458)
Although counsel for the appellant did comment on the fact
that the appellant had not taken the stand, he did so within the
bounds of Constitutional Law.

The prosecutor's comments however,

were clearly comments intended to cause the jury to draw adverse
conclusions as to why the defendant did not testify.
It was an unfavorable comment on the appellant's exercise
of his

Fif:~

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

-.:'.6-
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In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the
Supreme Court held that it is a violation of a defendant's Fifth
.~endment

privilege against self incrimination to allow a prosecutor

:o comment on an accused's failure to testify.

The reasons that

che court gave for this holding were that such a comment, if allowed
·J:;

the courts, becorn.es the equivalent of an offer of evidence; it

ts also a remanent of the inquisitorial system of justice where an

accused was forced to testify or face a penalty of contempt.

Finally,

:]e court reasoned that in allowing such a comment the court
~uld

be penalizing a defendant in a criminal case for exercising his

?i.fth Amendment privilege.
In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), this court
:o~d

that a prosecutor's comments that the defense had not

J~esented

any evidence was a violation of both the Fifth Amendment

:o the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of
:~e

Constitution of Utah.

a~g·.III1ent

With respect to a prosecutor's closing

the court commented,
We approve and reaffirm that duty and privilege of
analyzing the whole evidence as a general proposition.
However, there is a point beyond which it must not
go in regard to the defendant's constitutional right
just referred to, and this includes that it should not
be impaired or destroyed by making comments on the
failure of the defendant to take the witness stand.
569 P. 2d at 1116
The court went on to distinguish the case of State v. Kazda,

?.2d 949 (Utah 1975).
---~~

I::1 State v. Kazda, supra,

the court

:".at the p-::osecJtor has a perogati•1e and a duty to argue

~-- :S.stJect:s

o: ':;:t: -:ase so i.ong as ~~-:ere i.s

:10

di:-ect reference

~o
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the

failure to testify.

The court then recognized that

Upon a fair analysis of the prosecutor's remarks
here, the conclusion cannot be escaped that it was but
a thinly disguised attempt to do indirectly what the
prosecutor knew could not properly be done directly:
that is, to comment on the fact that the defendant had
chosen not to take the witness stand; and to persuade
the jury to draw inferences as to his guilt because of
his exercise of that constitutional privilege.
[footnote omitted) 569 P.2d at 1116.
Although counsel for appellant failed to object

to this

comment this court is not precluded from reviewing this issue.

T~e

issue is reviewable with a showing of exceptional circumstances,
State v. Winger,
Perez,

26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971).

23 Cal. Rptr. 569,

373 P.2d 617 (1962),

In People v

the Supreme Court

of California listed two circumstances under which it would
review a statement made in summation for which there had been no
objection registered.

The first of these exceptions arises

"Where the case is closely balanced and there is grave doub:
of the defendant's guilt, and the acts of misconduct are
such as to contribute :nateriallv to the verdict, a miscarr:a:
of justice results requiring a reversal.
[Citations
omitted) the other exception is where the act done or
remark made is of such a c~aracter that a harmful result
cannot be obviated or cured bv anv retraction of counsel
or instruction of the court . . In such cases t~e ~isconduct
will furnish ground for reversal of the judgment, even
where proper admonitions are given by the court"
373 P.2d at 627 quoting People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245,
324 P.2d 556 (1958).
The harm that results from a comment on a defendant's refusal to
take the stand is a denial of :Cis Fi:th Amendment pr:.·,ilege agains:
self incri:nination.

Gri.f:in v.

Ca~~fcrr.:..a,

S 1..2.9ra

court may instruct the j'....lry to dis:-egard the co-;::rnen~,

it still ha.s
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a : uror to dis regard such a remark.
~.either

Consequently, it could be cured

by a retraction nor by an instruction; such an error is

rubject to review by this court even if there was no objection
~egistered

at trial.

Further error was committed by allowing the prosecutor to
:ead from the transcript of the tape recording of the conversation
;ec~o~een

Kayle Shaw and the appellant.

(T.478)

Counsel objected to

this reading (T. 487) because the court had previously refused
:o admit the transcript into evidence (T. 333).
As was previously stated, the general rule is that counsel
:.as both a privilege and a duty to analyze evidence in his argument
:o the jury State v.

Eaton, supra; State v. Kazda, supra; however,

a corollary to this rule is that counsel may not present matters
:o the jury which r,vere excluded from evidence.

Garris v. United

3:ates, 390 F.2d 864 (D.C. 1968); People v. Perez, supra; People v.
',osenfeld, ll N.Y. 2d 290, 183 N.E. 2d 636 (1962); People v.
\:arthole,
·: .i...'TI

51 Ill. App. 3d 919, 366 N.E.

2d 606 (1977).

See also

Jur. 2d 331, Trials §253.
The reason why such a presentation is not allowed is that

:.~e

jury may infer that this evidence •,vas available and useful

-- Jrobat:.·,·e, but
.. ~earbg it.
--

~2~

:,,a~k

(1969).

~:cat

t:ce defendant has prevented the jury from seeing

Peoole v. Gilmer,

110 Ill. App.

2d 73, 249 :<.Ed.

-:'he probability that the jurors drer,v this

c:ce avoel:ant ;:ailed

~a

c:ake the stand leaves the strong
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impression that the appellant was hiding evidence from the jury.
Such an inference,

in the context of a case of this nature, can have

an extremely prejudicial effect.

The test to determine if a

statement in a closing argument is harmless or prejudicial <!las given
in State v.

Eaton, supra, where the court stated,

Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings and the
protections accorded those accused of crime under our
law, including the presumption of innocence and the burden
of the state to prove the defendant's guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, we believe that, on appeal, when there
is a reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was
prejudicial, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the
defendant.
This is especially true where the error involved
is one which transgresses against the exercise of a constitutional right.
Consequently, the rule which we have
numerous times stated is that if the error is such as to
justify a belief that it had a substantial adverse effect
upon the defendant's right to a fair trial, in that there is
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there may have
been a different result, then the error should not be
regarded as harmless; and conversely, if the error is such
that it is clear byeond a reasonable doubt that it was
harmless in that the result would have been the same, then
the error should not be deemed prejudicial and warrant.
granting a new trial. (footnotes omitted] 569 P. 2d at 1116 (
Since the appellant's whole defense was that he had been
set up by Kayle Shaw,

the inference that the appellant was trying

to keep probative evidence from the jury would tend to discredit
that defense.

Since the defense of the appellant was discredited

by the error,

there is a reasonable likelihood that the result •t~oul:

have been different if these errors had not been committed; conseque
the erc-or 'tlas prejudicial.

On this basis,

reversed and the case remanded to the Third

the judgment must be
~istrict

Court for a

trial.
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POINT C
BY REFUSING TO REQUIRE A WITNESS' FORMER ATTORNEY TO
TESTIFY AFTER THE ATTO~~EY CLAIMED THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BECAUSE A CLIENT'S PLAN TO CO~~IT PERJG~Y IS EXCEPTED
FROM THAT PRIVILEGE.
In the course of Kayle Shaw's testimony it was established
:~at
~irst

he had three charges of aggravated robbery,
degree, pending against him (T.20).

felonies of the

It was also established

that Bradley P. Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
had represented Shaw on these charges (T. 74).

Shaw testified that

he had retained private counsel whom he had just fired (T. 74).
Shaw also testified that he never stated that he was willing
to perjure himself (T. 74).

The appellant called Mr. Rich as a

·•i.tness for the purpose of establishing that Shaw had told Mr. Rich
:hat he (Shaw) was '"illing to perjure himself in trial on the
aggravated robbery charges (T. 362).

Mr. Rich claimed the attorney-

client privilege pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
•T. 364) .

The court allowed Mr. Rich to claim the privilege for

There is no question that the assertion of the privilege

:1:: '"ithin the general rule described in Rule 26 (1) 3 of the Utah

1

C"€1l.eral Rule. Subject to Rule 37 and except as otherwise provided by para>?;raph 2
:: eil.is rule corrrnunications found by the judge to have been beto,.,een lawyer and his
:::.ent in the course of tb.at relationship and in professional confidence, are privileged,
'-"c a client has a privilege (a) if he is the •Nitness to refuse to dis ... ~ose any such
::rt:J.1r1..:.cation, and ('::>) to nrevent his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c) to prevent any
:c.~e.r ·,~tness from disclosing such corrm..rnication if it carne to tc_l-)e knowledge of
~-o ·.·:itness \ i) i..'1 the course of its transmittal 'Jetween the client and c.'1e lawyer, or
::.) in a :r.:mner not reasonably to be anticipated ·"Jy the client, or (iii) as a result
:: " 'creach of s'-le lavNer-client relationship. The privilege may be clailred by the
:.~i':'.t ;_,_, oerson ,Jr bv. ':cis '!.awver, or if i.ncorrpetent, by his guardian, or if deceased
· ·-s :Jersona: reCJresencati·Je·. ;:":"e ::~r:.vilege available to a corporation or association
:~:-::.._-.a~t2sSponsored
~"r. by
·Cithe
Sse
S.J.lu.tion.
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Rules of Evidence.
if it fits

Hm.;ever,

the privilege may not be properly claime:

within one of the numerous exceptions described in

26(2) 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

~ule

The important exception here is

Rule 26(2) (a) which provides:
Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a communication if t'.
judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside from the commu:::.
has been introduced to warrant a finding that the legal
service was sought or obtained in order to enable or aid the
client to commit or plan to commit a crime or a tort.
It is obvious that in order to assert this exception "the secret
must be told in order to be kept," but this is a reasonable method of
reconciling the competing pelicies of the attorney-client privilege
and the search for truth in a trial, A. v. District Court of Second
Judicial District, 550 P.2d 315 (Colorado,l976).
Since perjury is a crime in Utah 5 , the plan to commit perj~,.
is covered by Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
4. Exceptions. Such privileges shall not extend (a) to a corrm..mication if the Juc;
finds t:hat sufficient evidence aside fran the c0!1111UI'lication, has been introduced to
warrant a finding t:hat u."le legal service '"'as sought or obtained in order to enable
said client to cOlii!Iit or plan to cOlii!Iit a crime or a tort, or (b) to a coom.m.icatic:
relevant to an issue beb'..;een parties all of 'Nhom clai:n t.lu'ough t.'1e client, regardles•
of,Nhet.'1er the respective claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter
vivos transaction, or (c) to a coom..;nication relevant to an issue of breach of dut::·:
lawyer to his client, or by the client to his lawyer, or (d) to a cOllilll..lrli.cation
relevant to an issue conce..."'Tling an attested docurrent of ·Nhi.c.'1 t.'1e lawyer is an
attesting witness, or (e) to a COlliD..ll'1ication relevant to a matter of coom:m interes:
beb'..;een two or rrore clients if made by any of them to a lawyer 'Nhom they have retal:'<
in cormon ,,;hen offered in an action between any of such clients.
5. 76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements.- A person is guilt:: of a::
of t."le second degree if in any official proceeding:
(l) He makes a false material stateriEI'lt under oath or affirmation or
swears or affinns the ::I"J.t."l of a il'aterial stater;ent :Jrev"ious:, m.de and !"'.e does x:
believe t."le statem:nt to ':Je tr'J.e; or
'
.
(2) He makes incons ister.t uaterial state!:'E'XS ·_;nder oat."l or aif::..._rmat:.2r
:,oc..~ '"Nit...l.in. t..'1e period of :.:..:ni.tat:..oc.s, one cf ·,...tc..~ :...s :a.::..3e ar.d :-:.ot ':Je:.:..~/eC. '::: :..:.:
to be true. In a prosecut:.on •..:r.der this sect::.or., it ;ceed :'OC be al:_egec or :Jrc·e:
~.:r.ic~ or the state:rrents is fa2.se jut onl·, !:b..a.~ or.E: :-r -:::--.e ct~er ·...ras ~alse and :-:ct:
believed bv the defer'.dant to ':Je tr'J.e.
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::~.sequently

is not pri?ileged.

The only previous occasion that the

::ah Supreme Court has had to rule in this question was in People v.

~

l Utah 205 (1875).

:"a~se

In that case, the defendant claimed error

an attorney ·.vas required to testify about a plan to commit forgery

::.at the defendant had consulted the attorney about.

The court held

::.a:: :;he attorney-client privilege could not be asserted.

The court

;:ated the general rule that "confidential communications between the

cocney and client are not to be revealed at any time" l Utah at 208, the

::::-: then reasoned:
But do all matters come within the scope of professional
employment? Are there not matters of such a nature, that
the law will not permit the relation of Attorney and Client
to exist in regard to them? While a member of the Bar may
be Counsel for, and keep the secrets of, one who has committed
a crime, can he be permitted to sustain any such relation
to one who proposes to commit a crime? Were he to attempt
to give aid and assistance, in the case last approved,
would not the law regard him as an accessory before the
fact, rather than as a Counselor at Law? Is it not the duty
of a ~ember of the Bar, as much as of any other citizen,
to expose contemplated crime, so as, if possible, to prevent
it 1 'Jhat do the books sav?
Lord Chief Baron Gilbert says: "Where the original ground
of communication is malum in se, as if he be consulted on an
intention to commit a forgery or perjury, this can never be
incl~ded ~i:::hin the compass of professional confidence; being
equally contrary to his duty in his profession, his duty as
a citizen, and as a man." (l Gilbert's Law of Ev. 277).
1 Utah at 209
!!ore recently, in State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P. 2d
:0~J).

:

=~e

:he Supr-eme Court of Kansas found there was no ·1iolation

a:::or:1ev-c::_ient pri·.:ilege •.vhen the court-appointed attorney

~ed

:he Cour: cha::: his client

~as

~ncooperat:ive

and planned to
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We perceive nothing violative of the confidentiality
inherent in the attorney-client relation by Mr. Anderson's
making known to the court defendant's avowed intention
of presenting perjured testimony. \fuile as a general rule
counsel is not allowed to disclose information imparted
to him by his client or acquired during their professional
relation, unless authorized to do so by the client himself
[citation omitted) the announced intention of a client
to commit perjury, or any other crime is not included
perjury, or any other crime, is not included within the
confidences which an attorney is bound to respect.
468 P.2d at 141
This evidence was obviously admissible because its purpose
was to impair the credibility of a witness6and in the course of his
testimony that witness had denied making such a statement (T.72) 7
Consequently it was error for the court to allow Mr. Rich to assert
the attorney-client privilege, thus preventing the appellant from
effectively impeaching the credibility of ti:l.e State's pn.mary witness.
The error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable
likelihood that if it had not been committed the verdict may have bee,.
different, State v. Eaton, supra.

This is because the appellant.' s

defense was that he did not sell the narcotics to Kayle Shaw, rather.
he was collecting a past debt from Shaw.

In order to do this it was

crucial that Shaw was shown to be a person who's testimony completel:'
lacked even a modicam of credibility.

To do this it was of the utmos:

importance that the appellant be able to show that Shaw was willing
to perjure himself.

After making this showing the inference could

·JE

that Shaw was willing to be under oath; therefore, he would be more
6. RUle 20 of the Utah Rules of Ev~dence: Subject to ?ules 21 and 22, for c~e ~
of i:npairing or supporting t.h_e credibility of a ,,n_!:J",ess, omy oart:J incl•...Cing t."e =~
calling him may e..xarrrine hi.tn and i.r1::roduce extr::.."'lSic ev'_dence concerni.:cg ar.y sca~c:e
conduct b:r him and omv ot.'1er :natter relevant ·~pen t.ke i.ss"-es of credi.b:.:.::.tv.
Rule 22(b) of the etah ~2s o-: Evidence. Exc:-i:""..si.c e-.:i~ence 0f 'Jricr cor:r:-;;.C~:

stata:nents, ~...net..,_,_er oral or ~.vritten, mde ~~;r t'l:.e ~,.rJ..~.ess, ::ia.. ~ ~L c.t:e di.sc::-eti:--r ::
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::,an 1Jilling to lie about buying drugs from the appellant,
:~.:erence

that

may have been enough to create a reasonable doubt of the

aJnllant's guilt in the minds of the jurors.

The error was

Jrejudicial, absent this error there is a reasonable likelihood that the
•:erdict may have been different.

The judgement must be reversed

and the case remanded to the Third District Court for a new trial.

POINT D
THE FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT
TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF A CRUCIAL WITNESS DENIED THE
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR WITNESSES
AS GUARN~TEED IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
In the course of re-direct examination the prosecutor elicited

::1e follo·.ving testimony with respect

to the aggravated robbery charges

:hat the witness, Kayle Shaw, was facing at the time:
Q:

And what was the name of your lawyer at that time?

A:

Carolyn Nichols.

Q:

And did you have personal contact with her at that time?

A:

Yes.

Q:

.~~d

A:

She was defending Louis Rashado, somebody I had set up.

why did you discharge her at that time?

Q:
Has Mr. Rashado been charged with the distribution of
narcotics also?
A:

Yes.

Q:

.~~d

A:

Yes.

Q

~as

th~s

·-'

s'->.e is representing

:~ere an~

~on::ic~

~im?

o:her reason
of in:erest:

'{ e s

t~at

you fired her other than

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3 5-

Q·

And what's that?

A:
Because I though she would be a setup because she
has been talking to Mr. Boone and several other people.

Q:

Did she inform you of that?

A:

Yes.

(T. 142)

On re-cross examination, counsel for the appellant estabLs·
that Shaw and his attorney were the only persons ?resent when the
witness decided that she was going to set him up.

(T.l54)

Shawalsc

denied that his attorney had accused him of lying to set people up.
(T.lSS).

It was also established that the subject matter of these

conversations would affect the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the appellant and of the co-defendant, Albo

(T.lSS). Kayle Shaw

then expressly waived any privilege he had with respect to the confident:iality of these communications with his attorney (T.l64).
this testimony was taken on Wednesday, June 15, 1977.

(T. 401)

o:

The next day,

Thursday, June 16, 1977, counsel for the appellant moved for a
unt:il Monday, June 20, 1977.

Al~

conti~:·:

The basis for the motion ·,.;as ::

secure the attendance of Carolyn Nichols, the attorney •,vith •,vhom Kav:e
Shaw had the aforementioned conversation.
and therefore unavailable until June 20,
was denied

Ms. :-Echols \vas in Texas
1977 (T. 401)

The Clotion

(T. C.OS) after arguments, the jurv retired for

their delioerations on t:1e afte::-noon of Fridav, J•.me ::.:, 1977.
In Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (A:.as;za, 1976), c:'le
Court ,Jf

Alas~a

ruled

o~

a si:,Jaticn ~.... t-.;

... 1--.

~:as

::--.e sJ.:::;.e as

........... ,.., .....

..... u::.-
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Su~:-2:E
.;.,...

-··

·;:~-e
52 ce

they r.vere driving in the area.

The t<.vo of them then removed

articles from the burned out car.

The state's theory was that

:>.e defendant knew where the car was and directed his friend to it.
:>e
3".:

~riend

testified that he did not see the car at the place where

::.e :lefendant saw it.
The defendant disclaimed any knowledge of the homicide,
d

testified that he could see the burned out car from the road.

5:~ce

the cvreckage had been moved, a police officer 'dho conducted

r:.e investigation '.Vas called by the defendant to give the exact
CE

.ccation of where the car r.vas found and he testified that it could
:e seen from the road.
:::::~edi.ately

The officer's attendance could not be secured

because he was out of tor..rn and was unable to fly to

::.e location of the trial due to bad weather.

The trial was continued

'" one day, but the weather did not break and the court refused

.~

:':'

::~ant

any further continuances and the trial was concluded.

:::en:lant <.vas convicted as charged.

The

After analyzing a great number

,_ :: cases the Alaska court found seven factors that must be met before

·'

':cu:-: grants a :nid-trial continuance to secure the attendance of a
··~:~.ess

These
l.

fac~ors

are:

The evidence must be rnaterial;8
The evidence cannot be e:icited from any other source,
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3.

The evidence must not be cumulative;

4.

It is probable that the witness can be secured in a

reasonable time;
5.

There

wil~

be little inconvenience to the court and to

others;
6.

The requesting party must have acted dilligently and is
9
good faith to secure the attendance of that witness,
and
7.

There is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony
10
would affect the .iury's verdict.
The Alaskan court found that all these factors were present.

On

that basis the court held that the de:endant's Sixth Amendment

;:ight to have compulsory process was denied because he was not allo:;,
to call favorable witnesses, Washington v. Texas,

388 U.S. 14 (1967)

The materiality of t:he testimony that Ns. Nichols would g.i·:1
was established by Kayle ShaT..J.

He stated the kno1-1ledge that Ms

;lichols had would probably affect the deter.:Jination of the guilt a:
innocence of the appellant (T. 155).

Furthermore, such evidence

"c~.

be considered for substantive purposes rather than for simply asses:.
9.

R.equiranent given in State v. Freshw-ater, 30 L't:ah 442, 8 5 P.447 (1906)

10. This is t:he general standard for prejudice, State v.

Eaton, supra.

-38-
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Shaw's credibility, as is made clear in the note following
Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Shaw also testified that he and Ms. Nichols were the only
persons present during the course of the conversation (T.l54).
Consequently,

there were no alternative sources of information.

M$. Nichols'

testimony would not have been cummulative.

There had been no showing that Shaw had made other prior
inconsistent statements.
By allowing Xr. Rich to claim the attorney-client privilege
the court has previously prevented the appellant from showing
that Shaw had made such statements.
The witness could have been served in a reasonable time.
As noted above the appellant made the request on Thursday, June
16, 1977;
~une

the witness would have been available on Monday,

30, 1977.

Sunday,

Since the courts are not open on Saturday and

Friday, June 17, 1977, would have been the only day that

"he trial would have to have been continued.
one dav delay is hardly unreasonable.
=~ls

\fuat amounts\ to a

The reasonableness of

delay is reinforced if this court takes judicial notice,

-39-
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pursuant to Rules 9

11

and 12(3)

12

of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

of the fact that it is a common practice in the Third Judicial
District to continue a trial from Thursday to Monday if the
judge hearing the case is to take the arraignment and sentencing
calendar on Friday.
These same considerations apply to the inconvenience that a
continuance over a Friday would cause to the court and to others.
ll. Rule 9: (l) Judicial notice shall be taken without request by a party, of the
comron law, constitution and public statutes in force in this state, and of such
specific facts and propcsitions of generalized knowledge as are so universally
known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.
(2) Judicial notice may be taken without request by a party, of (a) the
comron law, constitution and public statutes of every other state, territory and
jurisdiction of the United States, and (b) private acts and resoluttions of the
Congress of the United States and of the legislature of this state, and duly enam
ordinances and duly published orders, rules and regulations of governmental
subdivisions or departments or agencies of this state (and duly published orders,
rules and regulations of the departments or agencies of the L'nited States) , and
(c) the laws of foreign countries, and (d) suc..'l facts as are so generally known o:
of such comron notoriety 'Nithin the territorial jurisdiction of the court that the:
cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute, and (e) specific facts and propositi!:'
of generalized knowledge <Nhich are capable of imnediate and accurate dete=inatior
by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.
(3) Judicial notice shall be taken of each matter specified in paragranr.
(2) of this rule if a party requests it, and (a) furnishes the judge sufficient
i..'1formation to enable him properly to comply with the request and (b) has given
each adverse party such notice as the judge may require to enable the adverse
party to prepare to meet the request.
12. Rule 12(3): The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice
of any matter specified in Rule 9 whether or not judicially noticed by the judge.

- .c.o -
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;:1 State v. Salazar, supra, this consideration
:~e

~o1as

weighed against

possible prejudice to the defendant's substantive rights.

The rights

involved here as rJere involved in State v. Salazar, supra, are the
a?pellant's Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process of Law as that
clause applies the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment
of the United State's Constitution to the states and the rights
~aranteed

in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.

~questionably,

a one day delay does not so seriously affect the need

for efficiency and prompt disposition of criminal cases that these
substantive rights must be denied.
Also,
a~

there is no question that the appellant acted dilligently

in good faith in trying to secure the

atte~dance

of the witness .

.-\n attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols 'N'as made on the same afternoon
of the date that Kayle Shaw testified and the need for Ms. Nichols
co testify 'N'as made apparent.

(T.401)

The continuance was

requested the day following the attempt to subpoena Ms. Nichols.
It hardly ·.vould have been possible for

the appellant to act more

:illigently in trying to secure the attendance of this witness.
Finally,

there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony

·.could have affected the jury's verdict.

As has previously been

orgued, by pre'renting the appellant from challenging the credibility
·: l(.av~e Sha•.v the trial court denC:.ed the appellant his only defense;
=~at

~hat

'Jeing

~=:e::an~

~as

and

.~::::s:s:c?nt

Kavle Sha•.v had lied about l:Juying drugs from the
repayC:.ng the appellant for an old debt.

The prior

3ca:e:nents :v·ould a2.lo•.v the jury to see tl:'lat Shaw must

., .. , '·2-on :.·:'.n.; :'.Cl '!laking at :!.eas:: one of the i:1consistent statements
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narcotics from the appellant.

The evidence would also have been

considered substantively in determining the guilt or innocence of
the appellant.

Obviously there is a reasonable likelihood that this

testimony may have affected the jury's verdict.

Since all the factors delineated in State v. Salazar, supra
have been met in the case at hand, the appellant has been
denied his right to call favorable witnesses as required by the
compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United State
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
Washington v. Texas, supra.

The judgment and verdict must be

reversed and the case remanded to the Third District Court for a
new trial.
POINT E
THE CUMMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ERRORS
RESULTED IN A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL.
In State v. St. Clair, supra, this Court found that when
a trial court commits a number of errors which if singlely considere
are insufficient to •,.;arrant reversal, the c=ulative effect of thes
errors was prejudicial.

The individual errors in that case include6

An expression of a preconceived notion of the defendant's guilt by
t~e judge:

a ::efusal to allow the defenda0t' s counsel to show t':le ~i

of a key prosecution •,.;i:ness; a refusal :o

ad::~::..::

evidence

conce:r:ci~.i

the relationship bet•,.;een t':1e defendant and t':1e victim of the
"lomicide: a failure ::o instr'.lC: t"le jur:: :o d::..s::egard sta:ements Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eliciting of an inadmissible statement from a witness by the prosecutor;
and an unreasonable time limitation on closing arguments.
The errors in the case at hand are analogous to a number
of those errors in State v. St. Clair, supra.
:Estinct groups of errors in this case.
~nvolve

There were three

The first group of errors

statements made by Kayle Shaw which constitute prior bad

acts by the appellant.

Although the court seemed to indicate that

e:ror had been committed there was no instruction given to preclude
the jury from considering the evidence.

At least two of these

statements had been intentionally elicited by the prosecutor.
The second group of errors involves the prosecutor's closing
arguments where he made adverse comments about the appellant
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination;
and

~<~here

he presented evidence to the jury that had been held

i:1admiss ib le.
The final group of errors precluded the appellant from
i~peaching

~c

Kayle Shaw on the basis of prior inconsistent statements.

t:rror occurred when the court allowed Kayle Shaw's court-appointed

;e actorney to assert the attorney-client privilege when an exception
:o that IJrivilege applied.
'~ort

k

The court also refused to grant a very

c:Jntinuance to all01v Kayle Shaw's other attorney to testify

aoo<.:: a conversation she had '.Vith Sha·.v.

The prosecutor had elicited

;:a:eme"lts :'rom Shaw about that conversation.
If as a result of these errors there is a reasonable likelihood
'a· ::ce ~ur:1's ·:er-d:.ct ·.·JOuid have '::Jeen different,
?:~;

:.:'::.:i3.l.

then t!le error

As :Cas been pointed out in detail,

:he effect of
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the errors was threefold:

First of all,

the appellant '.vas r:1ade

out to be a man with a bad reputation who kept large quantities of
narcotics at his residence, who would possibly kill the witness
and who would interfere with the right to counsel of a witness who
was facing three first degree felony charges.

Secondly,

the

prosecutor made it appear that the appellant was willing to keep
probative evidence from the jury by not testifying and by not
allowing the jurors to read a transcript of the tape recording
of the alleged transaction.

Finally,

the appellant was not allowed

to impeach Kayle Shaw on the basis of prior inconsistent statements

The first set of errors enables the jury to make the infere
that the appellant is a bad person therefore he must have sold
these narcotics.

The second set of errors encourages the jury to

believe that the appellant is preventing them from considering
probative evidence.

The third set of erros prevented the jury from

adequately assessing Kayle Shaw's credibility.
The appellant's defense was that Kayle Shaw had lied about
narcotics sale, and that Shaw was repaying an old debt.

The first

part of this defense was severely impaired by the errors that
precluded the jury from assessing Kayle Shaw's credibility.

The j~:

being allowed to infer bad acts from the appellant's prior bad
acts may prevent the jury from believing the part of the defense
explaining why the

apoe~lant

had the s:ace's

~cnev.

There is a

similar result from t~ose er~ors ~hie~ allow :~2 j~ry ~o co~c:~de
that the appellant is hiding some:hing.
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.. 2 rdict.

The judgment in the court

belo•,o~

must be reversed and the

:ase remanded to the Third District Court.

CONCLUSION
The use of the tape recording of the transaction between
::1e appellant and Kayle Shaw violated the appellant's rights guaranteed

c:: the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah which resulted in a denial
:f defendant's right to a fair trial.

When the cu.mmulative effect

Jf these errors is considered the reversal of the trial court's

>dgment is mandated.
DATED this

day o£ March, l978.
Respectfully submitted,

LARRY R. KELLER
Attorney for Appellant
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